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Abstract The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) was estab-
lished by the UN Security Council in 1993 to prosecute persons responsible for war
crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia during the Balkan wars. As the first
international war crimes tribunal since the Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals set up
after WWII, the ICTY has attracted immense interest among legal scholars since its
inception, but has failed to garner the same level of attention from researchers in
other disciplines, notably linguistics. This represents a significant research gap, as
the Tribunal’s public discourse (notably its case law and Annual Reports) can open
up interesting avenues of analysis to researchers of law, language, and legal dis-
course alike. On its official website, the Tribunal claims that it has ‘‘irreversibly
changed the landscape of international humanitarian law’’ and lists six specific
achievements: ‘‘Holding leaders accountable; bringing justice to victims; giving
victims a voice; establishing the facts; developing international law and strength-
ening the rule of the law’’. While a number of legal scholars have studied and
critiqued the level of ‘achievement’ actually attained by the Tribunal against these
metrics and others, of interest to linguists is the ways in which this work might be
conveyed discursively. In this paper, we demonstrate how methods from the lin-
guistic field of corpus-based critical discourse analysis can be utilised to explore the
discursive construction of such achievements in the language of the ICTY.
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1 Introduction
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was
established by The United Nations’ Security Council in 1993 with the purpose of
‘‘prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitar-
ian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia between 1 January 1991
and a date to be determined by the Security Council upon the restoration of peace’’
[50: Article 2]. It is an ad hoc tribunal that was rapidly configured in response to a
specific need and with limited scope, time, and jurisdiction, and that has operated
since its inception under intense pressure from the UN Security Council to work
both efficiently and effectively to achieve goals set out in its mandate [13]. Since its
creation, the Tribunal has indicted 161 persons; at the time of writing, proceedings
are concluded on 147 of the Accused, and proceedings are ongoing for the
remaining 14 cases [28].
This is not to say that the Tribunal has functioned entirely as envisioned; indeed
its ongoing work is now being undertaken well beyond the initial timeframe. Under
pressure to complete work, in 2003 the ICTY adopted a 3-phase completion strategy
with the following milestones: investigations of war crimes should be ended by the
end of 2004; all first instance trials completed by the end of 2008; and all work of
the Tribunal should cease in 2010 [51, 52]. The Tribunal has failed to meet these
milestones, and it is anticipated at the time of writing (May 2015) that closure will
take place in 2017, after which national courts in the former Yugoslavia and the UN
Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals will take over and complete all resting cases
[53].
In addition to time pressure—or indeed perhaps even contributing to it—is the
fact that the Tribunal has been acting in the midst of highly contradictory
expectations to its achievements from other outside stakeholders. The establishment
of the ICTY was a decision made by the international community and not requested
at the national level by the countries of the former Yugoslavia, and has therefore
been critiqued by Balkan countries for being a distant and irrelevant court that is
unable to bring justice and peace to the region [13]. This led to the adoption of an
outreach strategy in 1999 [25], which is concerned with increasing the involvement
of the local communities and emphasising the Tribunal’s role in the restoration of
peace and the rule of law in the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, the international
community remains highly engaged in the ICTY’s mission as a modern
international criminal court that has inspired the establishment of other ad hoc
tribunals (for Rwanda and Sierra Leone) and the permanent International Criminal
Court.
As the first war crime tribunal after the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals
following WWII, the ICTY has also been followed by the international legal
community with immense scholarly interest. How would the Tribunal interpret the
criminal acts listed in the Statute? What Rules of Procedure would the criminal
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judges—appointed from countries all over the world and belonging to different legal
traditions—decide and agree on? Competing academic descriptions of the
appropriate role of a war crimes tribunal (i.e. prosecuting criminals, establishing
historical facts, bringing restorative justice, and ensuring international peace and
security) also define the scholarly debate about the lasting contribution of the
Tribunal [see 6, 34, 45].
Bearing this complex background in mind (and considering the contested
legitimacy of the ICTY), the way that the Tribunal has reacted to the critique is an
object worth studying more closely. However, to date, much of the discussion of the
ICTY’s achievements and limitations has been restricted to scholars of law, and
despite being a transformative institution, the Tribunal has failed to attract the same
attention in research traditions in other humanities and social sciences, notably
linguistics.
We would like to add to the scholarship on the Tribunal by considering a
linguistic perspective and re-focussing on the discourse of the ICTY in isolation. In
this way, we may investigate the ways that its achievements are presented and
constructed discursively in the ‘voice’ of the Tribunal itself.
On its official website [24], the Tribunal claims that its six main achievements
are:
1. Holding leaders accountable
2. Bringing justice to victims
3. Giving victims a voice
4. Establishing the facts
5. Developing international law
6. Strengthening the rule of the law
While a number of legal scholars have studied and critiqued the level of
‘achievement’ actually attained by the Tribunal against these metrics and others, of
interest to linguists is the ways in which this work might be conveyed discursively.
For instance, how does the Tribunal construct itself linguistically—in the
authoritative and informative texts (judgments and annual reports) it produces—
in response to the expectations of the stakeholders and the UN mandate that it has to
fulfil?
In this paper, we aim to demonstrate how a corpus-based critical discourse
analytical approach may be illuminating in the pursuit of scientific, empirical,
reproducible research on a very large amount of data made up of legal language.
From a substantive perspective, we want to add a discourse analytical viewpoint to
critical legal studies on international criminal courts by focussing on the way the
ICTY presents itself and its work linguistically, while highlighting innovative
methods that might be adopted by other scholars in the field. To this end, our broad
research questions are both methodological (a) and practical (b):
(a) How can methods from corpus-based critical discourse analysis contribute to
examination of the language of the law?
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(b) How are ‘achievements’ discursively constructed and manifested in two
collections of texts created by the ICTY?
By exploring these questions, we will contribute to closing a gap in research
within the field of legal discourse studies. The discourse of the ICTY—a court with
limited, ad hoc jurisdiction, acting in the field of international criminal justice for
the first time since the post-WWII trials—is a fertile area of inquiry for legal
linguists with an interest in the co-evolution of law and language. Moreover, the
disputed role of the Tribunal supplies the discourse analyst with valuable data for
critical examination of the way language co-constructs the power and image of a
legal institution.
We should make clear that our focus is on the language perspective of the law-
and-language interplay. However, we hope that our results may also pave the way
for asking specifically legal questions, especially concerning the way that the ICTY
has contributed to the development of international criminal law. The ICTY was a
prototype tribunal from which lessons have been learned, and the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court corrects certain shortcomings of the ICTY in terms
of the definition of crimes.1 While we believe those questions to be of interest, also
from a language perspective, elucidating them falls outside the scope of the present
paper, though we demonstrate how these methods may also be adopted in further
analysis.
2 Theoretical Background
The paper adds to research in three fields—international criminal law, Critical
Discourse Analysis, and Law and Language. It does so, both in terms of the corpus
linguistic methodology applied, and in terms of the critical stance taken to the
language of law.
Critical discourse analysis (CDA) is a field of inquiry concerned with the
interaction between language and society. Critical discourse analysts are generally
interested in exposing latent ideologies and power asymmetries, and to this end,
often work with institutional or other ‘privileged’ forms of discourse. In a list of
principles governing CDA, field leaders Fairclough and Wodak posit that
‘‘Discourse constitutes society and culture’’, that ‘‘Discourse does ideological
work’’ and also that ‘‘Discourse is a form of social action’’ [16: 258]. As language is
not the sole preserve of linguists but rather a common thread of interest running
through all of the humanities and social sciences, CDA has been successfully and
often powerfully applied in fields outside of linguistics. It is our belief that each
statement from Fairclough and Wodak [16: 258] remains powerfully true when we
specify legal discourse as the object of inquiry: law constitutes society, does
ideological work, and is a form of social action. However, from a CDA point of
view, the legal field remains an under-researched area. As legal language is usually
1 We would like to thank one of our anonymous reviewers for highlighting this aspect of the ICTY’s
practice.
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believed to be formulaic and routinized, with personal opinions of lawyers and
judges neutralized and descriptions of law and fact objectified, it is often presumed
that it would not be advantageous or particularly interesting to scrutinize it from a
critical discourse perspective. However, the neutrality of legal language may be
more a matter of belief and the ‘‘law’s desire to appear objective and authoritative’’
[49: 76]. Further, the more personal language of judges in common law countries
differs significantly from the more academic style and impersonal style of writing
adopted in civil law countries. Nevertheless, only very few studies have contributed
to the CDA agenda in law so far; the critical analysis by Kjær and Palsbro [31] of
Danish legal and media discourse on the European Court of Human Rights is among
the few papers that apply an explicit CDA approach to legal discourse. This does not
mean that critical views on language use in law are absent from legal research in
general; within the neighbouring disciplines of socio-legal studies and legal
anthropology, critical analyses of the use of language in law do exist, see e.g. the
work by Mertz [39] on language ideology in American law schools, Conley and
O’Barr [14] on powerful language in the legal process, and Goodridge [19] on legal
discourse as a linguistics of legal power, i.e. in witness statements. While these take
critical views of language of the law, they focus on oral texts (such as the language
of participants in the courtroom, or professor/student interactions in the law school
class-room), or treat legal language from a philosophical perspective. They do not
critically analyse written texts produced by legal institutions themselves. This may
be due in part to the sheer quantity of discourse produced by a court, particularly the
international tribunals. To address this challenge, we adopt a mixed methodological
approach: corpus-based critical discourse analysis.
Critical discourse analysis as a qualitative theory and analytical mindset has
lately found a comfortable companion in quantitative corpus linguistic methods.
‘‘Corpus linguistics sees language as a social phenomenon’’ [48: 97] and offers
toolkits for quantifying, visualising, and generalizing patterns of meaning in data,
whereas critical discourse analysis can shape and inform analysis of these results.
Computer-assisted methods in corpus linguistics allow for large-scale, systematic
analyses of big data sets incorporating mathematical and statistical measures of
language, and can be particularly helpful in reducing research bias and subjective
slant by exposing patterns that would not necessarily be apparent to the qualitative
research [7]. From the point of view of empirical legal and political studies, corpus
linguistics is a novel research tool, but fits perfectly to the big-data research agenda
of the field. Recent research [12, 15, 35, 43, 44] has applied computer-based
network analysis of courts’ citation patterns. Corpus linguistic methods have also
been used to add important detail to the otherwise broad picture of judicial practice
that network analysis gives [29]. Within the cross-disciplinary field of Law and
Language (legal linguistics) empirical studies of legal texts are widespread, but the
corpora traditionally consist of small text collections that are analysed manually: see
e.g. the work on legal genres by Bhatia [8, 9]. A methodological turn towards
computer-based corpora and corpus linguistics is now increasingly detectable,
especially within forensic linguistics [33, 46], translation studies [10, 11], and genre
analysis [17, 20, 37, 38]; the corpus-driven study by Kopaczyk [32] on the
development of the legal language of Scottish Burghs should also be highlighted in
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this context. Most of that work, however, is for descriptive purposes only and lacks
the critical view on language use in the legal field that is adopted in this paper.
3 Data and Methods
3.1 Description of the Data
The United Nations has made a variety of resources publically available through the
ICTY website.2 These take the form (for instance) of feature-length documentaries,
case summaries and individual dossiers. This is part of a concerted effort to make
the Tribunal’s actions known to society beyond legal professionals. Official
documents created as part of the ICTY mandate—such as Annual Reports and
judgements from the Trials and Appeals Chambers—are also posted online. It is on
these last two text types that we base our analysis.
The main collection of texts used is drawn from the Trials and Appeals
Chambers. These are available in PDF and OCR form, and though they were
produced in both French and English, it is the latter that is used in this study. This is
due largely to the English version’s status as the authoritative version; so while
‘‘[w]hile errors in errors of translation do occur, and smaller discrepancies between
the texts abound, the parties and the public can always have recourse to the
authoritative version in order to ascertain the exact meaning of a decision’’ [1: 882].
In 2013, all available judgements were collected from this repository. Though they
comprise a complete set (containing all judgements from a specific court), the
documents are problematic for various reasons. The encoding of PDFs was not done
rigorously or accurately, and special characters (for instance, Slavic accented
letters) appear incorrectly both in the downloadable documents and in automatically
converted text files. The texts converted through OCR are of variable quality, and
noise in the headers and footers is particularly frequent. A series of programmatic
cleansing scripts were devised and run to improve text quality as much as possible.3
This resulted in a corpus exceeding 10.5 million words, in 71 texts from the
Trials Chamber and an additional 50 texts from the Appeals Chamber—hereafter
referred to as the Trials & Appeals corpus. This corpus represents what we might
recognize as the discursive artefact of the main ‘work’ of the ICTY. It is important
to bear in mind that though these texts represent one discourse of the ICTY, they are
the work of a multitude of ‘voices’: three judges hear each case in the Trials
Chambers; the Appeals Chamber is composed of five judges. Add to this the
discourses of legal teams for the Prosecution and Defence, testimonies from victims
and witnesses, and in the event of an appeal, statements from the Accused/
Appellant.
2 http://icty.org.
3 By Matt Fisher of Tripod Software and Ioannis Panagis of iCourts. Amongst other smaller operations,
these were designed to perform the following tasks: (a) wherever possible, detect and enclose footnotes in
XML elements, thereby isolating lists of legal references from the main ‘body’ of the judgements and
appeals; (b) correct errors in special character encoding; (c) remove OCR-related noise.
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In order to triangulate an understanding of the Tribunal’s ‘voice’ as a whole, we
also incorporate a second data set: the Annual Reports corpus. The first difference is
in the accessibility; though the Trials and Appeals Chambers files are public, they
are difficult to find and extremely technical in nature, and real access to these is
restricted to those with knowledge of international humanitarian law and technical
savvy. Annual Reports—submitted to the UN Security Council and General
Assembly under Article 34 of the Tribunal’s Statute [27]—are more narrative in
nature. Though they are clearly for a highly informed audience, the information
contained is distilled to a level that is digestible by a general academic audience.
More importantly, these Annual Reports offer significant insight into the changing
emphases the Tribunal places upon its own work, and some information about the
activities it would hope to be recognized by both the UN and the greater public. We
collected reports from 1994 to 2013 and processed them into plain text as above.
The resulting corpus contains 423,621 words.
The methods and tools used to analyse these two corpora are detailed below.
3.2 Methods and Tools
In order to illustrate the potential contributions of corpus-based critical discourse
analysis to the study of legal language, we demonstrate features of two different
corpus linguistic tools (SketchEngine4 and Wmatrix5) in carrying out a small range
of methods: frequency, collocation, concordance, and key semantic tag analysis.
SketchEngine was developed by a team led by Adam Kilgarriff, and is a powerful
tool used mainly in lexicographical studies [30]. This corpus query system enables users
to load their own data before automatically applying lemmatisation (grouping items by
headword, e.g. run and running) and part-of-speech tagging (e.g. run_verb vs.
run_noun). Frequency lists—or lists showing all words in a corpus and the number of
times they occur—can be generated automatically, and may indicate interesting starting
points for corpus-driven analysis of high-frequency items. Conversely, taking a corpus-
based approach and searching for a specific item, users can build word sketches, or
‘‘one-page automatic, corpus-based summaries of a word’s […] behaviour’’ [30: 105].
If words appear regularly in close context, and this co-occurrence is statistically
significant, the items are said to be collocates. SketchEngine uses the association score
logDice to calculate collocation on scalable corpus sizes; as a rough guide, a logDice
score of 1 indicates that items collocate twice as often as might be expected, whereas a
logDice score of 7 indicates 100 times frequent collocation.
Collocation is a central concept in corpus linguistics, and can be of special
pertinence when considering legal discourse. Hunston and Francis [23: 270] argue that
words have little meaning or ambiguous sense in isolation, and derive their meanings
when occuring in particular phraseology. This is particularly true when considering
the language of the law. For instance, responsibility may have one meaning (imbued
with a multitude of folk understandings) in isolation, but in a set collocation phrase
such as command responsibility, the meaning is dictated by context and jurisprudence.
4 http://SketchEngine.co.uk.
5 http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/wmatrix/.
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Substitution for alternate collocates in these phrases dramatically shifts the meaning of
the entire set, as we demonstrate in Sect. 4.3 below.
We make use of a second tool—Wmatrix—to exploit its unique interface with the
UCREL Semantic Annotation System (USAS), which is not available in Sketch-
Engine. USAS was developed at Lancaster University for automatic semantic tagging
of input texts. The tagset comprises 21 major discourse fields and 232 further
subdivisions corresponding loosely to the Longman Lexicon of Contemporary
English [36]. This can be a helpful way of considering items within a corpus; as ‘‘the
semantic tags show semantic fields which group together word senses that are related
by virtue of their being connected at some level of generality with the same mental
concept … groups include not only synonyms and antonyms but also hypernyms and
hyponyms’’ [5: 1]. The existing USAS semantic lexicon is most often applied to
general discourse, and we endeavoured to extend it in such a way that it would be better
suited to analysis of legal language in general and to the ICTY in particular. Using a
frequency list of items tagged Z99: UNMATCHED by USAS, manual tags were
appended6 to the 250 highest frequency items (occurring over 340 times in the Trials &
Appeals corpus). All other expressions of particular legal interest (e.g. complicit) or
appearing in standard English and not due to an OCR error (e.g. his/her) occurring at
least three times in the corpus were also manually semantically tagged (semtagged).
This brings the total addition to 1432 single words. An additional 150 multi-word
expressions (e.g. joint criminal enterprise) were also semtagged.
Keyness is also calculated using Wmatrix. In corpus linguistics, key items in a
corpus are usually calculated by comparing wordlists from one corpus (the ‘target’)
to another corpus (the ‘reference’). In Wmatrix, users may calculate key words,
parts of speech, or semantic tags in a target corpus versus a reference corpus [41].
Users may either collect and load their own reference corpora, or make use one of
the reference corpora pre-loaded in Wmatrix; we use the British National Corpus
Written Informative Sampler, which is a large reference corpus of formal English,
considered satisfactorily comparable to the ICTY. We consider positive key
semantic tags, or those ‘overused’ in the target ICTY Trials and Appeals corpus, as
opposed to negative domains are ‘underused’ in comparison to a reference corpus.
This is measured using the log likelihood procedure [42], which demonstrates
confidence of significance.
Throughout the analysis of the discursive construction of the achievements of
ICTY, we hope to demonstrate how a variety of corpus linguistic tools or methods
may be employed in the analysis of the language of the law. These are presented as
potential components in larger studies both from linguistic or legal perspectives.
4 Analysis
In the sections below, we demonstrate three corpus linguistic methods and discuss
feasibility of application of these methods in the analysis of legal language. In
Sect. 4.1, we discuss frequency lists as a ‘way in’ to the corpus; in Sect. 4.2, we use
6 By Sigrun Valderhaug Larsen, Law Department, Lancaster University.
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collocation to trace the Tribunal’s self-presentation of agency over time; in
Sect. 4.3, collocation is used to explore phraseology; finally, in Sect. 4.4, we look at
one key semantic tag to analyse construction of ‘truth’ in the ICTY.
4.1 Frequency of Human Actors
Frequency lists—or lists of all of the words, lemmas, or phrases of a certain length
in a given corpus, alongside the frequency with which they occur—are well utilized
as indicators for possible ‘ways in’ to the corpus. They are generally more useful for
critical investigations when downsampled or sorted for some salient feature. For
instance, we are interested in the ways that human actors are named and referred to
throughout the proceedings of the ICTY. Though we have a list of the proper names
and aliases of those involved, the attributes by which social actors are defined and
grouped are often a telling feature of any text.
We have reviewed a frequency list of headwords and extracted the 20 most
frequent ways of referring to social actors (human common nouns and attributive
adjectives serving as identifiers) in the ICTY Judgements and Appeals. The most
frequent of these deal with court proceedings: witness/Witness and prosecution, as
well as Accused. Less prominent in frequency but more so in variety are
references to position within the military hierarchy. These include: soldier,
brigade, Staff (of the VP/MUP7 etc.), police, commander, and member (of the VP/
MUP, various brigades, etc.). Lack of military affiliation is also present in
nomination strategies, i.e. with civilian deaths contrasting to and resulting from
military operations. More frequently, however, civilian populations are referred to
using non-specific, generalised nomination strategies: man, person, people, and
even population, indicating the genocidal scale of acts occurring. The importance
of affiliation is also apparent in the appearance of group, which occurs both in
reference to command groups undertaking destructive, violent military operations,
but also to groups of villagers found to have been massacred by these forces. The
ethnic nature of the conflict also comes into focus in viewing this list: Bosnian,
Muslim, and Serb are all highly frequent nomination and/or attribution strategies.
Ethnic/religious identity aside, only detainee and victim refer directly to those
most affected by the conflict while also encoding their status into the nomination
strategy (Table 1).
Considering the top item in the frequency list can also inform our analysis of the
ICTY’s stated achievements. The relatively high frequency of witness/Witness—
highlighting this as the most common type of social actor in the Trials and Appeals
corpus—may align with ‘‘Giving victims a voice’’ [24], but only when this identity
overlaps with the much less frequent victim. Contrast, for instance, line 1 (where the
witness is also a victim) to line 2 (where basis knowledge of the existence of the
sites is denied) excerpted from the same text, below. Only one of these (1) reflects
the achievement reported by the ICTY.
7 VJ: Vojska Jugoslavije, The Army of Yugoslavia; MUP: Ministarstvo Unutrasnjih Poslova, The
Yugoslavian Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs police forces.
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1. One witness testified that she was taken out five times and raped and after each
rape she was beaten. (IT-94-1-T)
2. Most witnesses for the Defence stated they had no knowledge of the existence
of the camps, or if they did, they referred to them as ‘‘collection centres’’.
(IT-94-1-T)
Though this paper is not a full social actor analysis, this is a rich avenue of
further research. Future work may look at whether witnesses are represented directly
using courtroom aliases (as in line 1), showing their direct participation in the ICTY,
or whether ‘witnesses’ are described as being present during various events, but are
not present at proceedings. This has an impact on achievement of representation of
victims’ voices.
We see then, how this sort of list may give some interesting ‘ways in’ to the
data, but requires manual intervention with intent, e.g. a research question
involving the quantification of certain types of nomination strategies. Another
corpus method that might be more helpful is one that goes beyond sheer
quantification to ‘zoom in’ on one social actor in particular and trace their
actions (or ‘agency’) over time.
Table 1 Top 20 most frequent
lemmas related to human
referents in the ICTY trials and
appeals corpus
No. Noun lemma Frequency Freq./million
32/51 witness/Witness 25,220/14,392 2384.46/1360.71
37 prosecution 20,109 1901.23
53 member 13,996 1323.27
67 man 11,976 1132.29
68 police 11,906 1125.67
73 Bosnian 11,394 1077.26
74 person 11,281 1066.58
90 soldier 10,327 976.38
113 Muslim 8541 807.52
114 Accused 8515 805.06
118 civilian 8269 781.80
122 group 8072 763.18
124 brigade 8012 757.50
134 detainee 7500 709.10
150 Staff 7105 671.75
152 people 7058 667.31
153 population 7049 666.46
158 Serb 6819 644.71
170 victim 6533 617.67
172 commander 6725 635.82
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4.2 Key (Contrastive) Collocations Indicating Diachronic Shift
Many researchers are interested not just in the social actors, but also types of
processes commonly occurring within a text; this may give rise to further analysis
demonstrating, for example, agency of or impact upon groups of actors previously
listed. We are interested not just in how often the Tribunal represents the voices and
experiences of others, but also how they represent themselves as an institution. To
do this, we turn briefly from the Trials and Appeals corpus to the Annual Reports
corpus, which represents the unadulterated voice of the Tribunal, and which allows
analysis of self-representation to the wider public.
The Annual Reports corpus has the additional benefit of taking place across a
diachrony, allowing us to examine any potential changes in the discourse of the
ICTY from its inception toward its closure. To test for changes in discourse over
time, we have split the Annual Reports into two subcorpora (1994–2003 vs.
2004–2013), which may then be compared to one another using forms of keyness
analysis. SketchEngine allows for the generation of contrastive collocation tables,
which indicate the strength of collocation relative to subcorpus. As one of the main
functions of the Annual Reports—if not the primary goal—is to represent the
ICTY’s actions and activities in the past year, we have taken the Tribunal itself as
our search node in this test analysis.
In Table 2, we reproduce the ‘Subject of’ section of the WordSketch of Tribunal.
The items listed in Table 2 are actions undertaken in grammatical constructions
where the Tribunal is the subject, occurring with greater-than-expected frequency as
measured by the LogDice statistic. Items in italics indicate a preference for one
subcorpus or the other, with strongest preference appearing at the top (for
1994–2003) and the bottom (for 2004–2013) of the table. Items which are not in
italics share a more equal preference between the two subcorpora, and appear in the
middle of the table, with two LogDice scores indicated.
We shall discuss in turn, those items associating with the Tribunal more strongly
in the first half of the Annual Reports (1994–2003), then those with a stronger
association with the Tribunal in the second half of the Annual Reports (2004–2013),
before briefly touching upon those shared more equally between the two subcorpora.
Illustrative examples (or concordance lines) are accompanied by the year of their
corresponding annual report.
4.2.1 Agency in 1994–2003
Many of the items showing preference for the Tribunal in the first half of the Annual
Reports can be clearly linked to the ICTY’s early status, for instance: begin,
become, and establish. The structure of the Tribunal itself is described repeatedly in
concordance lines containing comprise, indicating lack of widespread familiarity
with its makeup:
3. As is well known, the Tribunal comprises three organs: its judiciary, consisting
of 11 Judges assigned to two Trial Chambers and one Appeals Chamber, the
Office of the Prosecutor and the Registry. (1996)
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Even from the outset, the Tribunal constructs itself prominently and positively,
establishing bureaucratic assemblies (‘‘an Inter-sessional Working Group’’, ‘‘a
working group’’, ‘‘a witness protection programme’’) and judicial processes (‘‘a
code of international criminal procedure’’), but also social connections (‘‘valuable
contacts’’) and its own existence and reputation (‘‘itself as a fully operational
international criminal court’’, ‘‘its credibility’’). The starts of processes are
likewise positively evaluated, as in line 4 below, where the Tribunal claims that
it dispenses justice and achieves tangible results. Towards the end of the first
half of the Annual Reports, the Tribunal reflects instead on what it has become
(e.g. in line 5), though evaluative lexis remain positive, reinforcing self-
construction as important and efficient: the ICTY is ‘‘fully functioning’’,
providing fair trials while maintaining protection for vulnerable parties.
Table 2 Activities enacted by the Tribunal as a subject, indicated by a WordSketch
Subject of Frequency
1994–2003
Frequency
2004–2013
LogDice
1994–2003
LogDice
2004–2013
indict 16 0 8.9 –
begin 9 0 8.2 –
enjoy 6 0 7.8 –
become 6 0 7.7 –
do 7 0 7.6 –
establish 7 0 7.6 –
welcome 5 0 7.5 –
expect 5 0 7.5 –
rely 5 0 7.5 –
bring 6 0 7.5 –
comprise 5 0 7.4 –
cover 5 0 7.3 –
reach 4 0 7.2 –
play 4 0 7.2 –
increase 5 0 7.1 –
be 71 23 7.9 6.2
take 10 4 7.8 6.5
receive 10 4 8.1 6.8
have 148 70 10.3 9.2
issue 9 6 7.6 7.0
adopt 3 5 6.4 7.1
continue 21 39 8.9 9.8
approach 0 4 – 7.3
host 0 7 – 8.0
conclude 0 12 – 8.6
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4. Through the development and application of concrete procedures, the Tribunal
is beginning to dispense that justice, achieving tangible results for both victims
and accused. (1998)
5. During the reporting period the Tribunal has become a fully functioning
international criminal court, providing fair trials to the accused, while
maintaining a high degree of protection for victims and witnesses. (1999)
Despite this positive self-presentation as playing an active and important role in
international humanitarian jurisprudence, the verbs appearing in and preferring the
first half of the Annual Reports do not reflect such unbridled success in the actual
work of the court. Firstly, only two (indict and bring, as in bring justice) relate to the
central, judicial work of the Tribunal. In viewing the concordance lines, these are
also presented with reservations, as the early Tribunal encountered problems in
meeting these goals:
6. That mandate has not yet been properly fulfilled because the vast majority of
persons indicted by the Tribunal are still at liberty, ignoring their indictments
with seeming impunity. (1997)
Indeed, in the 1994–2003 subcorpus, it is difficult to determine exactly which
processes the Tribunal is (successfully) undertaking in regards to jurisprudence. In
six out of the seven key instances of do, this item is followed by not. In the single
instance not followed by negation, the clause is completed with the foil ‘‘undone’’
(see line 7 below), again underscoring its own lack of agency or efficacy. Here, the
Tribunal is defining itself not by what it does, but what it does not do (as in line 8).
7. The present annual report of the International Tribunal…its first, covers the
period from 17 November 1993 to 28 July 1994 and describes in detail what the
Tribunal has done during that period and what it has been obliged to leave
undone. (1994)
8. The Tribunal does not prosecute members of ‘‘ethnic groups’’, but individuals
who are accused of grave crimes. (1995)
This strikes us as unusual given that the texts are designed to summarise the
(judicial) activities of the Tribunal in the previous year; it seems that it would
behove the ICTY to stress material/legal processes. Instead, we observe a rather
unexpected number of mental/behavioural processes. In concordance lines where
the Tribunal is the agency of expecting, these expectations are of States (80 %) and
NGOs (20 %) cooperating fully with judicial principle and process by participating
without influence, and assisting in the fulfilment of shortcomings, e.g. of facilities
and services (see line 9 below). Beyond expectation, the Tribunal also states plainly
that it relies ‘heavily’ on this State Support, particularly as ICTY workload
increases (line 10). It is made clear in the Annual Reports that success is contingent
upon cooperation and effort on the parts of various other parties.
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9. Lacking an incarceration facility, the Tribunal expects States to provide
facilities to imprison persons whom the Tribunal convicts. (1998)
10. The Tribunal relies heavily not just on the cooperation of States of the former
Yugoslavia but on all States for its daily operations and it proceeds under the
assumption that States will provide their full and unreserved support. (1997)
The Tribunal enjoys many forms of cooperation and support (e.g. ‘‘immunity’’,
‘‘privileges’’, ‘‘the usual exemptions’’, ‘‘the support of the United Nations’’, ‘‘a high
degree of administrative support’’) and welcomes further assistance in matters both
legal (e.g. ‘‘surrenders’’, ‘‘statements’’, ‘‘the establishment of a truth and reconcil-
iation commission in Bosnia and Herzegovina’’) and administrative (‘‘two
additional judges’’). Towards the latter portion of the first half of the Annual
Reports, the Tribunal constructs itself as reaching landmarks of efficacy and
recognition:
11. After 10 years, the Tribunal has reached a point of some institutional
maturity, as the events of the past year demonstrate. (2003)
However, this trajectory does not continue in agency expressed between 2004
and 2013. We discuss the radically differing self-construction of the Tribunal
below.
4.2.2 Agency in 2004–2013
In contrast to the early subcorpus (of which the Tribunal was construed as the agent
of a multitude of processes), collocates in 2004–2013 are few, including only host,
approach, and conclude. Once more, these have surprisingly little relation to the
judicial processes expected from the texts; host, for instance, refers to the ICTY
hosting bureaucratic/social events, such as ‘‘visits’’, ‘‘conferences’’, and ‘‘cere-
monies’’. As the Tribunal approaches the completion of its work, the Annual
Reports contain frequent references to the number of cases concluded (as in line 12
below). This is the most transparent representation of the Tribunal as an active agent
of legal change and due process found in this subcorpus.
12. The Tribunal has concluded proceedings against 136 of the 161 persons
indicted by the Tribunal. (2013)
4.2.3 Agency Across All of the Annual Reports to Date, 1994–2013
We move now to consider processes of which the Tribunal is an agent with relative
equity across both subcorpora. Many of these are common auxiliary verbs (i.e. be,
take, and have). However, further analysis into open class verbs allows us a view of
similarity in the corpora, after distinguishing differences.
A greater degree of agency is discovered in verbs sharing near preference
between the early subcorpus and the late subcorpus of Annual Reports. Of particular
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interest are those related to the law: issue (‘‘orders’’, ‘‘directives’’, and ‘‘warrants’’)
and adopt (‘‘rules of procedure and evidence’’, ‘‘a largely adversarial approach to its
procedures’’, ‘‘an amendment to rules 72 and 73 of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence’’).
A continuation of the court’s 1994–2003 self-representation as an entity reliant
upon outside support is echoed here. The Tribunal describes itself as receiving
administrative and financial assistance (‘‘support’’, ‘‘donations’’), as well as staff
and facilities (‘‘seconded personnel’’, ‘‘two servers and 50 network computers’’).
These findings can be demonstrated in microcosm when viewing concordance
lines for continue. In all of its ongoing work, the Tribunal describes itself as
continuing to benefit from the support of others (e.g. line 13) and to achieve
important, tangible results (see line 14). However, the process has not been without
significant difficulties, which have hindered the court from operating at the level of
efficacy it had hoped or expected to achieve (line 15).
13. Throughout the reporting period, the Tribunal has continued to benefit from
the services of gratis personnel, that is, personnel provided at no cost to the
United Nations by donor Governments or non-governmental organizations.
(1997)
14. Notwithstanding periodic setbacks resulting from obstructionism by some
States, the Tribunal continued to achieve tangible results. (1999)
15. The Tribunal continued to encounter certain difficulties with respect to the
application and interpretation of its headquarters agreement, specifically in
relation to the privileges and immunities that judges and staff members receive
in comparison to those working for other international organizations. (2003)
Therefore, we find that both the early and late subcorpora, as well as the
processes in between, depict self-representation strategies focussing more on stating
the importance of the ICTY, rather than demonstrating it by detailing action. This
was visible in the early subcorpus (where the process of establishing the court was
more in focus than the processes taking place inside it) as well as the late subcorpus
(which contained little agency to speak of). The achievements of ‘‘Developing
international law’’ and ‘‘Strengthening the rule of the law’’ are difficult to uncover in
the very public discourse of the ICTY, and this is a problem that is exacerbated as
time moves along.
To take another view of how the ICTY might construct their contribution to
‘‘Developing international law’’, we move back to the Trials and Appeals corpus to
analyse a different achievement: ‘‘Holding leaders accountable’’ [24].
4.3 Variations in Phraseology: The Case of Responsibility
One powerful way to use corpus linguistic methods (which might be of particular
interest to those investigating the language of the law) is to investigate variations in
phraseology. Perceived lack of variation—or firm preference for formulaic
phraseology—is a reason that many scholars do not consider legal texts to be rich
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fodder for deep linguistic analysis. However, in the example below, we will
demonstrate that variation does exist, and that this can be (critically) meaningful.
The development of international humanitarian law is seen (at least by the
Tribunal itself) as one of the ICTY’s main achievements [26]. Specifically, the
delineation and distribution of accountability—encompassing all levels of the
social-military scale from citizen–soldiers up to heads of state, and allowing for
both individual and joint responsibility—was to be a defining feature of the
Tribunal. At the outset of the ICTY, this was pursued through the use of the
mechanism of ‘command responsibility’ or ‘superior responsibility’, through which
those in superior (military) positions are held criminally responsible for failing to
adequately punish or prevent crimes committed by persons under their command or
authority. Descriptions of individual responsibility and command responsibility can
be found in Article 7(1) and Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute, respectively [27]:
Article 7: Individual criminal responsibility
7(1) A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided
and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime…shall be
individually responsible for the crime…
7(3) The fact that any of the acts…was committed by a subordinate does not
relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason to know
that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the
superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such
acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
In the later years of the Tribunal, the concept of ‘joint criminal enterprise’ has
overtaken command/superior responsibility in ICTY jurisprudence (see Ambos [2]
for a legal analysis of the relationship between these forms of responsibility and
additional explanation for change in usage over time). However, in the Tribunal
document detailing its accomplishments, the ICTY states that application of Article
7(3) specifically ‘has removed uncertainty’ about distinctions of criminal respon-
sibility in a war-time environment [26: 5]:
The Tribunal has applied the modern doctrine of criminal responsibility of
superiors, so-called command responsibility. It has clarified that a formal
superior-subordinate relationship is not necessarily required for criminal
responsibility. In the same vein, the Tribunal has removed uncertainty about
the level of knowledge to be expected from a superior whose subordinates
were about to commit crimes or actually committed them […]
However, we will demonstrate here that a level of uncertainty about the boundary
between individual and command responsibility perpetuates in the ICTY docu-
mentation, in part due to mixed terminology employed throughout the cases. This
has potential consequences for the claimed achievements of ‘‘Holding leaders
accountable’’ and ‘‘Developing international law’’.
In Table 3, we have replicated a section of the WordSketch for responsibility in
the Trials & Appeals corpus. These ‘modifiers’ give an insight into the compound
nouns (or n-grams) comprising responsibility, occurring with unusual frequency.
The highest-ranked of these feature expected results, those endorsed and contained
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within the ICTY Statute: individual, superior, command, and (joint) criminal
(enterprise). Yet beyond these results, we see great variation in near-synonyms:
direct, personal, ultimate, overall, full, primary, and immediate. The meanings of
these will be explored in greater depth below to establish some understanding of the
(legal) ramifications of their use in context.
4.3.1 Items Indicating Singular Responsibility
The official ICTY term under Article 7(1) for direct, singular involvement in
wartime crime is individual responsibility. This is the most frequent iteration
(occurring 842 times) and the most statistically strong association (with a score of
11.82). Two alternatives also appear on the WordSketch: direct and personal.
Concordance lines featuring the collocation between direct and responsibility
show a clear synonymy with individual responsibility. In the majority of these 49
cases, Article 7(1)—which refers to individual responsibility—is clearly referenced.
Arising from this alternative is an additional complementary phrase: indirect
Table 3 Modifiers of
responsibility, as given in a
WordSketch
No. Modifier Frequency LogDice
1 individual 842 11.82
2 criminal 1789 11.59
3 superior 496 11.3
4 command 450 9.91
5 diminished 73 9.01
6 mental 66 8.34
7 alleged 70 8.02
8 direct 49 7.9
9 State 40 7.85
10 full 37 7.77
11 primary 25 7.25
12 personal 23 6.85
13 disciplinary 16 6.59
14 own 19 6.49
15 ultimate 13 6.49
16 such 36 6.34
17 legal 20 6.32
18 immediate 11 6.16
19 social 9 5.97
20 joint 17 5.68
21 bear 7 5.67
22 great 9 5.6
23 overall 8 5.6
24 main 9 5.57
25 enterprise 18 5.45
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responsibility. This corresponds to Article 7(3). An example of these items in use
can be found in Line 16 below.
16. In general, Article 7(1) concerns the accused’s direct responsibility while
Article 7(3) deals with his indirect responsibility. (IT-05-87-T)
While direct responsibility does illustrate variation in use of legal terminology,
the more interesting collocate of singular responsibility is personal. This is due to
differing (and distinctive) uses in the voices of the accused, appellants, and of the
Tribunal itself. Of 23 instances where personal collocates with responsibility, 14 of
these are in the ‘voice’ of the Tribunal, six are indirect quotations in the ‘voice’ of
the accused, and three (all from ‘Kupresˇkic´ et al.’, IT-95-16) are in the voice of both
the accused and the Tribunal simultaneously. Instances within each of these three
categories are uniquely interesting.
The most frequent pattern is the use of the Tribunal voice in reporting upon
personal responsibility. In all cases where personal responsibility is used either in
the Tribunal’s voice, or in the accused’s voice reporting Tribunal speech, personal
is a direct substitution for individual, as evidenced by recurrent reference to Article
7(3). This indicates an evolution in the legal distinctions between superior/com-
mand responsibility and individual responsibility in the ICTY jurisprudence, where
command responsibility is an expansion of personal responsibility for the actions of
others, e.g. subordinates; see line 17 below for an illustrative example.
17. The Chamber would note that this Judgement is the first in the history of the
Tribunal to convict Accused persons solely on the basis of Article 7(3) of the
Statute and recalls that command responsibility must be conceived as a type
of personal responsibility for failure to act. (IT-01-47)
The appearance of personal responsibility as a report of the appellant’s
statements is an almost flawless predictor of text type. In all six cases where this
appears in the ‘voice’ of the Accused alone (i.e. without the secondary indirect
influence of the Tribunal), it occurs in a plea bargain. Further, in each of these six
cases, the acknowledgement of personal responsibility is accompanied by moral/
emotional discourse indicating remorse (see line 18) and self-confessed wrongdoing
(see line 19).
18. Furthermore, where the plea, and the circumstances in which it came to be
made, involves a profound acknowledgement of personal responsibility, it
may demonstrate that an accused is genuinely remorseful. (IT-95-17-S)
19. Bralo has not, however, alleged any form of duress emanating from his
superiors such that he was compelled to commit the crimes of which he has
been convicted…He has taken full personal responsibility for those crimes
and has acknowledged that he knew them to be wrong. (IT-95-17-S)
With nearly perfect precision, the use of personal responsibility by the Accused
will indicate that the text type is a plea; indeed, in only one instance is this phrase
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used in a plea in the voice of the Tribunal. However, the concept of remorse appears
immediately afterwards in this case:
20. In the Todorovic´ case, it was stated that: ‘‘In order to accept remorse as a
mitigating circumstance, the Trial Chamber must be satisfied that the
expressed remorse is sincere.’’ In this regard, the Chamber takes account of
Dusˇko Sikirica’s statement during the Sentencing Hearing, in which he said:
‘‘I deeply regret everything that happened in Keraterm while I was there. I feel
only regret for all the lives that have been lost and the lives that were damaged
in Prijedor, in Keraterm, and unfortunately, I contributed to the destruction of
these lives.’’ (IT-95-8-S)
When used by the Accused, the declaration of personal responsibility holds the
legal ramifications of individual responsibility under Article 7(1), but also carries an
emotional element that seems to have been incorporated to improve the possibility
of reduced sentencing with demonstrated remorse during the plea. This emotive
component is unique of individual (specifically personal) responsibility, and does
not seem to appear in concordance lines arising from collocates indicating ‘group’
responsibility, discussed in Sect. 4.3.2 below.
4.3.2 Items Indicating Collective Responsibility
Based upon Article 7(3) of the ICTY Statute [27], expected (and endorsed)
terminology to indicate criminal responsibility of the known actions of a group of
subordinates would include superior and command responsibility. Once more, these
are the most common, occurring 496 and 450 times, respectively. As an aside, it is
interesting to note the near parity in these frequencies. The inclusion of two terms—
whose distinction may have been meaningful in other courts (i.e. post-WWII)—
used simultaneously and/or interchangeably is a contributing factor to imprecision
and ambiguity in the Statute and the proceedings. This is further aggravated by the
repeated use of two additional terms: ultimate responsibility and overall
responsibility.
Both forms are relatively infrequent, likely owing to the existence of highly
frequent, endorsed alternatives: superior, command, and joint criminal enterprise.
Ultimate responsibility collocates 13 times, and overall responsibility collocates
eight times. These instances cannot be linked as neatly to the existing Statutes as
above. Rather, inspection of the concordance lines must be undertaken to determine
that ultimate responsibility and overall responsibility are being taken for the actions
of (military) subordinates or as acting (military) superior.
21. The Prosecution argues that by virtue of this position, ultimate responsibility
for the conduct of ABiH soldiers rested with Rasim Delic´ and that he had more
power than any other person in the ABiH to ensure that his subordinates were
punished for their misdeeds and prevented from perpetrating other criminal
conducts. (IT-04-83)
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22. The Appeals Chamber notes that the Trial Chamber dismissed the allegation
preferred by the Prosecution, namely, that Prcac´ was deputy commander of the
Omarska camp, and that this dismissal was material to the determination of
Prcac´’s overall responsibility for the crimes committed at the camp. (IT-98-
30/1-A)
As evidenced in line 22 above, these uses are cause for ambiguity in the court
system themselves. Use of the phrase overall responsibility in the Trial Chamber is
revisited in the Appeals Chamber when the Appellant’s role as deputy commander
is questioned. As this does not directly connect to the Statute through shared
terminology or direct reference to the Article 7(3), there is some obscurity in the
wording of the Tribunal. In the next section, we discuss three further collocates with
ambiguous or contradictory meanings in context.
4.3.3 Ambiguity in Responsibility
Given the preponderance of terminology around responsibility, it is nearly
inevitable that cases of irreconcilable ambiguity should arise.
When primary and responsibility collocate, the resulting meaning could be
synonymous with command responsibility, but seems to relate more closely with the
folk (or common) meanings associated with principal functions. In concordance
lines 23 and 24 below, we see two such examples. In line 23, it is Mucic´ (as a
commander) who is found by the Trial Chamber to have had primary responsibility
for civilian detention; this is defined by terms similar to those laid out in Article
7(3), but is not linked to criminal enterprise. In line 24, it is the Trial Chamber itself
who declares its own primary responsibility (for evaluating evidence), quite outside
of the established Statutes of international humanitarian law.
23. The Trial Chamber found that Mucic´, by virtue of his position of command,
was the individual with primary responsibility for, and had the ability to
affect, the continued detention of civilians in the camp. (IT-96-21)
24. Such a de novo reassessment must be made by a Trial Chamber as the
Chamber with primary responsibility for evaluating the evidence […] (IT-98-
29-A)
Further confusion arises dependent upon the identity of the (self-)referent. Full
responsibility is most often a burden acknowledged by the Accused/Appellant rather
than assigned by the court. In only six concordance lines out of the full 37 is full
responsibility assigned by someone other than the Accused/Appellant; it is more
frequently found in indirect quotation of pleas, or of direct quotation of military
guidelines or other documents. However, note lines 25 and 26 below—the form is
very similar. The difference lies in the findings; Jokic´ (line 25) pleads guilty to
Article 7(1) and 7(3), claiming both individual and command responsibility,
whereas Deronjic´ (line 26) accepts full responsibility for individual responsibility
only. This very ambiguity is questioned in the Appeal reproduced in part in line 27,
where superior responsibility as defined in Article 7(3) is reverted to.
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25. Miodrag Jokic´ ‘‘agrees that he is pleading guilty to the Indictment because he is
in fact guilty and acknowledges full responsibility for his actions’’ under Article
7(1) – aiding and abetting – and Article 7(3) of the Statute. (IT-02-60-T)
26. It is now for this Trial Chamber to balance the extreme gravity of the crimes,
for which the Accused accepted full responsibility, against this contribution to
peace and security. (IT-02-61-S)
27. The Appeals Chamber clarifies, however, given that the expression ‘‘full
responsibility’’ adopted by the Trial Chamber may be somewhat misleading,
that the responsibility of a superior under Article 7(3) of the Statute is only
triggered by a superior’s failure to prevent and punish the crimes of his
subordinates of which he has the requisite knowledge. (IT-01-47-A)
This instance is quite similar in form to the final collocate in the ambiguous set:
immediate. Each of the 11 instances of the collocation between immediate and
responsibility occur in the Trial and Appeal of Veselin Sˇljivancˇanin. This term is
actively problematized by Sˇljivancˇanin, who reduces the accusation of immediate
responsibility to a literal reading of personal accountability for acts perpetrated upon
prisoners of war. This misinterpretation stems from the failure of the Trials
Chamber to utilize the form command responsibility, with its legal distinction
inclusive of his position over other soldiers.
28. The circumstances of his conduct which led to his conviction have been
identified. In particular, they reveal a failure to act to protect from severe
criminal abuse the prisoners of war who were his immediate responsibility.
(IT-95-13/l-ES)
29. The Prosecution responds that Sˇljivancˇanin fails to show how the Trial
Chamber’s use of the words ‘‘immediate responsibility’’ is ‘‘in any way
discordant with its factual findings’’ regarding his responsibility for the tortures
of the prisoners of war at Ovcˇara and that his allegation that other JNA soldiers
had some responsibility over the prisoners is irrelevant. (IT-95-13/1-A)
Though it is clear that the ICTY is working under extreme pressure, the erosion
of terminology established in jurisprudence is demonstrated to have led to
ambiguity in what, exactly, the Accused are acknowledging or admitting to, as well
as inhibiting understanding of case basis of the Prosecution. This tarnishes the
achievements of ‘‘Holding leaders accountable’’ by obscuring accountability and
fails in ‘‘Developing international law’’ by contradicting terminology laid out in
previous jurisprudence.
4.4 Key Semantic Domain Analysis
Wmatrix offers an easy-to-use interface allowing researchers to calculate key
semantic tags in their data compared to a reference corpus. The very high preference
for the G2.1 tag: LAW AND ORDER—appearing in the first position, indicating the lowest
p value—is reassuring; this is precisely the sort of finding to be expected when
comparing a corpus of specialized legal language to one of general written informative
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English. Likewise, G2.1-: CRIME (position 4), G3: WARFARE (6), and G3-: ANTI-WAR
(10) are all expected results. A high number of Z99: UNMATCHED (3) tokens still do
appear in the corpus due to our prioritization of only very frequent proper nouns. The
semantic tag of N1: NUMBERS can be attributed to the high instance of dates/years,
footnote numbers, case numbers, and article references. Others are of more critical
interest (Table 4).
By way of example we will analyse the language of one semantic domain,
A5.2?: EVALUATION: TRUE, listed in the seventh position on the key semantic tag list.
It is not surprising to find it among the most dominant semantic domains in the
discourse of a criminal court. ‘Finding the truth’ is what criminal courts are
supposed to do, and ‘‘Establishing the facts’’ is one of the Tribunal’s own advertised
achievements. Indeed, ‘‘legal discourse is paradigmatically concerned with truth,
both in terms of evidence or verification, and also, more generally, in terms of the
definition or delimitation of power and powers in the discourse of the rights, duties,
capacities and procedural forms generally of both public and private law’’ [19: 192].
However, methods of discursively constructing this ‘truth’ are of interest to both
linguists and lawyers.
The automated calculation of key concepts in the Trials and Appeals corpus—
particularly when presented in semantic categories—reveals interesting patterns in
the language of the court in this domain. Thus, when one looks more closely into the
words and phrases chosen by the court to express its evaluation of the ‘truth’, the
limited lexical variability is striking. Only few terms are applied, and the exact same
phrases are reproduced repeatedly. Even more surprising is the fact that truth is not
among the most frequently used words in the semantic field, even though
ascertaining the truth of what happened—and who did it—is the main task of a
criminal court.
With 37,372 occurrences (3533.4 per million words), evidence tops the list in
terms of frequency, followed by fact (freq. 11,457 or 1083.2/million), prove
(freq. 3015 or 285.1/million), factual (freq. 1916 or 181.2/million), and proof
(freq. 1434 or 135.6/million). In comparison, the word truth amounts to only 358
Table 4 Top ten key semantic domains in the ICTY trials/appeals corpus as compared to the BNC
Written Informative Sampler, ranked by order of descending log likelihood value
Key semantic tag O1 %O1 O2 %O2 LL value
1 G2.1: Law and order 263,371 3.04 2068 0.28 29,727.94
2 N1: Numbers 389,646 4.49 14,171 1.9 13,370.49
3 Z99: Unmatched 426,263 4.91 18,377 2.46 10,435.09
4 G2.1-: Crime 72,411 0.83 383 0.05 9101.89
5 H2: Parts of buildings 96,417 1.11 1669 0.22 7460.89
6 G3: Warfare, defence and the army; weapons 116,944 1.35 2604 0.35 7416.35
7 A5.2?: Evaluation: True 59,888 0.69 543 0.07 6433.11
8 Q2.2: Speech acts 158,202 1.82 7553 1.01 2993.47
9 Q2.1: Speech: Communicative 91,526 1.06 3808 0.51 2424.42
10 G3-: Anti-war 16,422 0.19 46 0.01 2308.89
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instances, including its use in non-legal phrases such as ‘in truth’. This seems to
indicate reluctance on the part of the tribunal to describe what it is doing in terms of
discovering the ‘truth’, let alone declaring universal truth.
However, the relatively few instances of truth in the language of the judgements
give a clear picture of how the Tribunal constructs its role as a legal institution that
must meet the evidentiary standards of a criminal court in the specific context of the
war crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia. We can ‘drill down’ further by
investigating the constituent word forms semantically tagged as A5.2?: TRUE. The
concordance lines below were discovered by using this method. In line 28, three
A5.2? semtagged items (evidence, truth, facts) appear. We can see the standard
narrative of the role that evidence plays in a criminal trial, which is to assist in
ascertaining ‘‘the truth of the facts’’:
28. Every criminal trial involves two issues: first, that the crimes charged have
been committed and, second, that an accused is responsible for those crimes.
The object of evidence is to ascertain the truth of the facts with respect to these
two issues… (IT-99-36-T)
However, in the specific context of the ICTY, other goals must also be achieved:
to put an end to war crimes, to take effective measures to bring to justice the persons
who are responsible for them, and to contribute to the restoration and maintenance
of peace [27]. Like all criminal courts, expediency if a requirement of fair trial
rights [21, 22]. The task of ascertaining the truth is therefore limited by the need to
handle the cases efficiently:
29. The Appeals Chamber recalls that the right to cross-examine witnesses is a
fundamental right […] Relevant to the exercise of this right is the trial
chamber’s duty to exercise control over the mode and order of witness
examination so that it facilitates the ‘‘ascertainment of truth’’ and avoids
‘‘needless consumption of time.’’ (IT-05-87-A, with reference to Rule 90(F) of
the Rules of Procedure)
A manual analysis of the concordances in which truth is embedded confirms the
impression given by its underuse that the word does not belong to the standard
vocabulary of the tribunal. It turns out that truth is unevenly spread across the case
law of the tribunal and occurs only in a limited number of specific contexts. Indeed,
the tribunal tends to use the word truth only when arguing for the mitigating effect
of guilty pleas; see line 30 for an extract from the tribunal’s judgement in an early
case.
30. In confessing his guilt and admitting all factual details contained in the Third
Amended Indictment in open court on 4 September 2003 Dragan Nikolic´ has
helped further a process of reconciliation. He has guided the international
community closer to the truth in an area not yet subject of any judgement
rendered by this Tribunal, truth being one prerequisite for peace. (IT-94-2-S)
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The comparatively low frequency of truth indicates that there is a tension
between the legal language of a criminal court and the language of a war crimes
tribunal whose task is not restricted to establishing whether or not the Accused is
guilty of the crimes committed or not. As it highlights itself, the Tribunal’s mandate
is to contribute to establishing the truth about the conflict. However, as a court of
justice it can do so only in the context of fact-finding that may prove or fail to prove
the guilt of the Accused. Other textual features identified by the automated corpus
analysis supports this finding.
The widespread use of particular phrases repeated as formula reveal a
considerable degree of standardization of the juridical language applied in this
domain. While some of the phrases are general criminal legal language formula (e.g.
‘‘The Prosecution has proved/failed to prove’’), others are specific to the language of
evidence created and reproduced by the ICTY. As such, they express the Tribunal’s
construction of the procedural steps to be taken in order to establish the truth. The
concept of ‘standard of unreasonableness’ is a case in point. The following are
quotations from the case law of the Appeals Chamber in which the standard was
developed and established. Again, the specific texts are identified through the
concordance lines in which the high frequency words belonging to the semantic
domain A5.2?: TRUE are embedded:
31. The two parties agree that the standard to be used when determining whether the
Trial Chamber’s factual finding should stand is that of unreasonableness, that is,
a conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached. (IT-94-1-A)
32. The capacity of the prosecution evidence (if accepted) to sustain a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt by a reasonable trier of fact is the key concept; thus the
test is not whether the trier would in fact arrive at a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt on the prosecution evidence (if accepted) but whether it could. (IT-95-10-A)
Investigating the concordance lines of fact, factual and evidence uncovers the
frequent co-textual use of the phrase reasonable trier of fact. A word search shows
that it has been used 1127 times in the full Trials and Appeals corpus, making it
almost as standardized and repetitive in the language of the Tribunal as (prove)
beyond reasonable doubt (used app. 3000 times) with which it often co-occurs
(linguistically) and which it modifies (conceptually).
Use of methods from corpus linguistics can also expose interesting deviations
from the norm that may not have been accessible to the reader. In establishing the
normal (high frequency) constructions of fact in the key A5.2? semantic tag and
examining the surrounding context, we discover an interesting ‘slip of the tongue’.
The use of a problematic alternative phrase—‘‘prove as best as it can’’—also
confirms that truth is not the part of the vocabulary of evidence. It is a non-technical
expression which is used by the court in a Judgement only once, even if it is
probably more in accordance with the actual difficulties of fact-finding in the
context of a war crime trial indicated by the legal standard ‘‘prove beyond
reasonable doubt’’ (used in 575 instances out of a total of 3015 occurrences of
prove).
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33. Concerning Martic´’s allegation that Judge Moloto’s comment ‘‘that the
Prosecution must proceed and prove its case as best it can’’ revealed the Trial
Chamber’s (mis)understanding of the ‘‘beyond reasonable doubt’’ standard,
the Appeals Chamber notes the following. As the parties had not reached an
agreement on certain facts, the Presiding Judge simply remarked that the only
way to proceed was to let the Prosecution prove its case ‘‘as best as it can’’. In
doing so, he did not articulate the standard of proof to be employed by the
Trial Chamber, but simply recalled that the burden of proof rests on the
Prosecution. (IT-95-11-A)
The formulaic language used in this particular semantic domain is revealing of
the way the ICTY constructs evidence and truth. The legal effect following directly
from the text of the judgements makes judicial language in the field of criminal law
an obvious object of routinization and ritualization. Is the Accused guilty or not
guilty of the crimes with which he or she is charged? The Tribunal’s answer to that
question has immense legal and human consequences. This is why the court cannot
conclude that the Prosecution has ‘‘proved as best as it could’’ that the Accused is
guilty. The standard formula prove beyond reasonable doubt as well as the ICTY-
created standard of no reasonable trier of fact could have reached a different
conclusion make it possible for the Tribunal to speak authoritatively about the
‘facts’ of the case, without referring directly to ‘truth’ and without casting doubt on
the possibility of ‘‘Establishing the facts’’ with straightforward modifications like
prove as best as it can.
‘‘Establishing the facts’’ is one of the self-promoted achievements of the ICTY.
The key semantic domain analysis confirms that fact-finding is indeed one of the
core topics of the judgments. Of course, this is not a surprising result, but variation
in semantic construction of ‘fact’ and preference shown therein can be telling. The
complex historical and political context in which the Tribunal has acted is mirrored
in the language adopted in the judgments. Of particular interest is the fact that the
word truth is almost exclusively used by the court in arguments concerning guilty
pleas, while the Tribunal is otherwise reluctant to address its fact-finding mission in
terms of ‘truth’. What emerges is an interesting built-in conflict between the public
and political expectations of the ICTY and of the way it actually fulfills its roles,
constrained as it is and was by the difficulties of ascertaining evidence of events, the
time pressure under which the Tribunal has had to work, and the complex
relationship between the desire to bring justice to the victims and the need to meet
the standards of the rule of law including giving the accused a fair trial; cf. the legal
debate on the different roles of Courts of Law and Truth Commissions [18, 45].
5 Concluding Remarks
The purposes of this paper have been twofold: to demonstrate how corpus
linguistics methods can contribute to analysis of the language of the law; and to
explore how the ICTY’s own stated ‘achievements’ are discursively manifested
and constructed in two collections of texts created by the Tribunal: the
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authoritative texts of its trial and appeal judgements as well as the informative
annual reports. We believe that some interesting results and some limitations have
come to light in approaching both of these goals, and we discuss them in turn
below.
5.1 Considerations and Limitations
Law is performed in language, but to analyse a Tribunal through the texts it
generates is to treat discourse as an artefact. In this study, we have demonstrated
several methods from corpus linguistics and triangulated the various ways in which
the ICTY functions (e.g. as a finder of facts) by looking at the textual evidence it
leaves behind. Because legal language must be so precise, this sort of study is better
suited than most to treat discourse as an artefact. But this still cannot fully bring out
the intricacies of the actual court in action. For instance, in order to establish the
‘fact’ of conviction, two out of three judges must reach an agreement; this means
that one judge may not agree that the ‘truth’ has been established, or that the
document created necessarily reflects its entirety. We have also considered
discourse as a process, where the Tribunal constructs itself and shapes the law
over a diachrony. In order to do this, we must have a good awareness of the powers
and tensions that occur outside the texts but are reflected inside of it.
There are a number of additional considerations when taking a corpus linguistic
approach to critical discourse analysis; scholars in the field have acknowledged a
number of limitations. The most pertinent for this work is that sections of the corpus
are largely decontextualized: while law scholars may find it critical to know, for
instance, where on the page (e.g. which section or paragraph) a certain argument
appears or case is cited, most corpus processing programs treat constituent texts
(e.g. judgements) as a whole. In the case of the ICTY, we must also be aware of the
language issues. The Tribunal has two official languages; the English version of the
texts that we have analysed is, in some cases, translated from a French original text.
Moreover, the many participants in the Tribunal (especially witnesses and accused)
speak a number of languages that are all translated into English and French both in
the court and for the official documentation.8 Though we take this at face value,
another interesting avenue of research may be in taking a critical view of these
translations as a potential source for flattening or increasing variation in
phraseology, as well as identifying mistranslations and aspects of evidence which
are lost in translation.
These limitations might be addressed in future work, particularly if scholars are
inclined to take a corpus linguistic approach. Corpora can be annotated with
metadata such as time period, the makeup of the court, dissenting judges,
paragraphs and sections. Citations and social actors may be cross-referenced across
various texts. This is time-consuming but can be rewarding if research questions
8 Evidence given in the Bosnian, Serb, and Croatian languages during court hearings is interpreted into
English and/or French. Subsequently, citations from this evidence may occur in the judgments as
unmarked translations which are set off from the rest of the judgement texts and may have resulted in
inaccuracies.
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deal with issues such as time series analysis, argumentation, disagreement, citations,
and document structure.
In our study, cleansing of the texts and removal of the footnotes was considered
sufficient. However, the process of finding, downloading, cleaning, and loading
texts into programs could have been significantly aided by the ICTY and the UN
itself, if data legacy were added to the considerations of a court. Though posting
PDFs online is a step in the right direction, we believe that a real contribution to the
people of the region and to scholars in the field would be the development of a
queryable portal that would make the work of the court more accessible and
transparent. This would aid further work as well as replicability.
5.2 Discussion
The Tribunal has had to navigate in the midst of competing expectations of its role
and functioning, while especially living up to the mandate given to it by the UN
Security Council. A close-up view of the way it uses language gives the researcher a
unique chance to see how the Tribunal handles this mandate.
By utilising a variety of methods from corpus linguistics and critically analysing
the results, we have discovered discursive remnants of the Tribunal’s stated
‘achievements’, but also uncovered problematic language use that raises doubts
about the court’s operation and its contribution to the international legal
community—or at least documents the difficulties that the ICTY has faced. In
legal terms, it was the first war crimes tribunal after the Nuremburg and Tokyo
trials, and as such had to develop modern international criminal law almost anew, or
in other words to make ‘‘creative use’’ of the sources of international law, which is
seen by some as unjustifiable in criminal law; see in this regard Swart [47]. In
political terms, it has had to cope with the dual pressures exerted at both the
international and national levels. The UN mandate in itself has not been a sufficient
basis for it to claim its authority vis-a`-vis the population in the former Yugoslavia.
At the same time, the tribunal has had to deliver fast and tangible results in terms of
convictions of responsible leaders. The instable terminology that we have
documented for the different categories of the concept of responsibility reflects
the immaturity of the court’s case law in this regard.
Future corpus linguistic research may elucidate the further development of the
concept of responsibility, including the contested ‘‘joint criminal enterprise’’. This
may be done by including the case law of other criminal courts, both the other ad
hoc tribunals (the ICTR and the Special Tribunal for Sierra Leone) and the
permanent criminal court ICC. Thus, corpus linguistic can add a discourse
perspective to legal studies of responsibility in international criminal law (for an
overview of both history and development of international criminal law, see e.g.
Ambos [3, 4]).
Use of the most basic tool of corpus linguistics—frequency analysis—does
indicate that the Tribunal discursively encodes one of its ‘achievements’, that of
‘‘Giving victims a voice’’. Witnesses who are also victims appear regularly in the
texts (see Sect. 4.1), and they are directly quoted in evidence, which is an
empowering role. However, the Tribunal has not been as successful in
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demonstrating its own agency. Using collocation analysis, we found that the
Tribunal is markedly less active over time in presenting itself in Annual Reports. As
an agent, the ICTY is occupied by the work of self-creation in the first half of its
mandate, and appears side-lined by administrative tasks in its later years (Sect. 4.2).
The Tribunal’s importance is stated rather than demonstrated, and in this way, the
achievements of ‘‘Developing international law’’ and ‘‘Strengthening the rule of the
law’’ are dubiously portrayed in reports circulated to the UN and to the greater
public.
In another view of ‘‘Developing international law’’, we analysed one way in
which the ICTY strode towards ‘‘Holding leaders accountable’’ (Sect. 4.3). While
terminology was asserted in jurisprudence, the court was seen to deviate from
phrases of accountability, resulting in confusion, appeal, and general erosion of the
contribution to international law. A similar pattern was exposed in key semantic
domain analysis of A5.2?: EVALUATION: TRUE. The word truth is dispreferred by the
ICTY, as it does not belong to the standard vocabulary of legal procedure. However,
even in ‘‘Establishing the facts’’, ‘slips of the tongue’ can derail the court and may
cause scepticism about effective fact-finding and therefore, appropriate administra-
tion of justice (Sect. 4.4). In addition to this, despite the importance of the truth-
telling function of the court, ‘‘[i]nformation about the trials in general has been
poorly disseminated: To the extent that peoples in the former Yugoslavia are denied
access to the proceedings of the ICTY, the truth exposed through the judicial
process may have no appreciable impact on interethnic reconciliation’’ [40: 87].
In general, formulae in legal language are used for reasons of language economy
and efficiency, or for reasons of institutionalization and bureaucratization, where
personal emotions or even doubt are hidden behind an objectified, neutralized and
standardized language that does not leave room for self-reflection or individual
concerns. In the context of war crime tribunals, this laconic, formulaic legal
language seems inadequate in relation to the emotions and circumstances that made
people commit crimes against humanity in the war-torn communities and the
immense quest for redress among the victims of the mass atrocities.
Nonetheless, the achievements of the ICTY are encoded and performed in
language, and some forms more clearly serve the mandate than others. Once
formulaic language is established in the jurisprudence, deviations from this
language damage the integrity of the court and erode its legacy. The ways in which
social actors (including witnesses and even the Tribunal itself) are discursively
constructed offer interesting insights into the ways that these roles are conceived
and enacted. The ICTY’s failure to portray itself as active and focussed in the
Annual Reports and Trials and Appeals Chambers is iterated in its relative inactivity
(overrunning) and lack of focus (straying from and being drawn back towards its
mandate) outside of the texts. This has proven an interesting exercise in
triangulating representation using multiple methods and data sets, and indicates a
rich area for further exploration.
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